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Harassment and the Implications of Charges
Against Safeway
Sarah L. Ream*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment in the workplace was once an accepted occupational
hazard for many working women. However, with the passage of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 and the numerous sex discrimination cases
that followed, most employees and employers recognize that sexual
harassment by supervisors or co-workers is intolerable and violates the law.
Many may not realize, however, that sexual harassment perpetrated by non-
employees such as customers, clients or independent contractors is also
prohibited. Recently, employees of Safeway, Inc., a major North American
supermarket chain, filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) claiming that certain Safeway policies amounted to
acquiescence in, if not encouragement of, sexual harassment by customers.
If these employees are allowed to adjudicate their claims, third-party sexual
harassment will likely become the next frontier of sexual harassment
litigation.
Part II of this paper summarizes the development of the law regarding
the two types of causes of action for sexual harassment-"quid pro quo"
and "hostile work environment." The third section discusses third-party
sexual harassment, generally considered to be a subset of hostile work
environment harassment. The final two sections analyze the charges
recently filed against Safeway and the implications of such charges.
'B.A., University of California, Davis (1995); M.A., California State University, Fullerton
(1997); J.D. candidate, University of California, Hastings College of Law, class of 2000.
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
2. See Amy Mathews, The Sexual Harassment Revolution: Employer Liability for Third
Party Sexual Harassment, 65 UMKC L. REv. 977, 979 (1997).
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II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW GENERALLY
With little discussion or debate, Title VII introduced a federal cause of
action for sex discrimination in the workplace.3  Specifically, Title VII
prohibits employers from discriminating "against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex br national origin.'
4
However, it was not until the late 1970's that courts began to recognize
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.5
In 1980, the EEOC published guidelines identifying sexual harassment as a
"form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VI.,,6 Since the passage of
Title VII, two distinct types of claims of sexual harassment have evolved:
"quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment." 7
A. QUID PRO Quo SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Courts initially only recognized a cause of action based on quid pro
8quo. To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must show that a "term or
condition of employment was imposed on [the plaintiff] and that this term
or condition was imposed on the basis of sex."9 The plaintiff has the initial
burden of showing the existence of a prima facie case of sex
discrimination. I0 Then, the burden shifts to the defendants "to rebut the
prima facie case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
their actions."11 If the harassment was perpetrated by a supervisor or a
comparable agent of the employer, the employer may be held liable based
3. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). The inclusion of "sex" as a
protected class was an eleventh-hour attempt by a conservative congressman to thwart
passage of Title VII. He believed that his fellow congressmen would refuse to pass a bill
giving equal rights to women. He was mistaken. See Rachael A. Hetherington & Barbara
Childs Wallace, Recent Developments in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 MISS. C. L. REV. 37,
45-50 (1992).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
5. See e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (abolishment of an
employee's job due to her refusal to engage in a sexual relationship with her supervisor
constituted gender discrimination); Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(recognizing a claim of sex discrimination by an employee who rebuffed her supervisor's
sexual advances and was thereafter terminated.); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th
Cir. 1979) (female employee stated a cause of action under Title VII for sexual harassment
due to her termination after she rejected sexual advances by her supervisor).
6. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
7. Id. at 66-67.
8. See Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters
Restaurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 169
(1997).
9. EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
10. See id. at 607. To make out a prima facie case the plaintiff must show: 1) she belongs
to a protected class; 2) that the harassment was unwelcome; 3) that her response to the
harassment effected the terms conditions or privileges of her employment; and 4) there is a
basis for imputing liability to the employer. See Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 639
F. Supp. 1199, 1024 (D. Utah 1986).
11. Sage Reality Corp., 507 F. Supp. at 607.
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on agency principles.
12
Generally, quid pro quo harassment arises between a superior and a
subordinate, as the power to grant or withhold privileges and benefits is a
necessary aspect of this form of harassment.13 Often plaintiffs attempt to
demonstrate some form of tangible loss due to the discrimination, such as
failing to receive a promotion or being subjected to a demotion.14
However, the Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson explicitly held that
such a tangible loss is not required for a plaintiff to prevail under Title
VII.15 This holding enabled plaintiffs to more easily bring suit under the
second type of sexual harassment claim, hostile work environment, as the
harm in such cases is often intangible and difficult to quantify.
1 6
B. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
While the availability of the quid pro quo cause of action afforded
employees recourse for certain unfair employment practices based on sex,
it failed to redress sex discrimination that creates an uncomfortable and
often intolerable working environment.' 7  Such harassment may be
perpetrated by co-workers (i.e., people at the same level of the organization
as the plaintiff), as well as by supervisors.' 8 To address this problem, in
1980 the EEOC promulgated guidelines articulating a cause of action for
hostile work environment sexual harassment.' 9
The EEOC's guidelines borrowed heavily from case law regarding
racial discrimination.20 Courts had held that Title VII was meant to protect
employees from "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult" in the
workplace based on race.21 The EEOC looked to the substantial body of
judicial decisions holding that employees have a right to be free from
racially discriminatory intimidation in the workplace, and extended this
protection to discrimination based on sex.22
Six years later, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to interpret the
23EEOC guidelines in Meritor. The Court held that "a plaintiff may
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on
12. See Rhee, supra note 8, at 170-71.
13. See Mathews, supra note 2, at 987.
14. See id.
15. 477 U.S. at 64.
16. See Rachel Mead Zweighaft, Comment, What's the Harm? The Legal
Accommodation of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment,, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 434, 437
(1997).
17. See Rhee, supra note 8, at 171 n.33.
18. See id. at 171.
19. See id. at 172 n.37.
20. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
21. Id. at 65.
22. See id. at 66.
23. Id.
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sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment. ' 24 To prove such a
violation the plaintiff must show that: 1) she belongs to a protected class; 2)
"the conduct in question was unwelcome"; 3) the harassment was based on
sex; 4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an
abusive working environment; and 5) there is some basis for imputing
liability to the employer.2
Not all workplace conduct of a sexual nature that is offensive to and
unwelcome by an employee rises to the level of sexual harassment. The
Court in Meritor explained that "[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment."' 26 To
show that the harassment meets this requirement, several courts have held
that a plaintiff must prove two elements: 1) that she suffered some sort of
psychological harm due to the harassment, and 2) that it was reasonable
that the harassment would cause such harm.27
Courts differ on whether "reasonableness" should be viewed from the
perspective of a reasonable person generally, or a reasonable person of the
victim's gender. The Ninth Circuit in Ellison v. Brady, approved the
gender-specific approach.28 In Ellison, a female employee alleged that
receiving unwelcome love letters from a male co-worker created a hostile
working environment.29 Reversing the District Court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant employer, the court reasoned that a "sex-blind
reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to
systematically ignore the experiences of women." 30 Several other circuits
have also adopted the "reasonable victim" standard.31
Even if the plaintiff proves that sexual harassment has occurred, she
may still have difficulty establishing employer liability.32 While an
employer's liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment is based on agency
theory and employers are presumptively liable for such harassment, courts
apply a more rigorous standard when co-workers or non-employees create
24. Id. at 66.
25. Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, 808 F. Supp. 500, 512 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd,
40 F.3d 1244 (4th Cir. 1994).
26. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir.
1982).
27. See Mathews, supra note 2, at 988. However, Title VII does not explicitly require
psychological harm to the victim. See id. at 988 n. 116. Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that a plaintiff is not required to prove debilitating psychological harm to prevail on
her claims. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
28. 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
29. See id. at 874.
30. Id. at 879.
31. See West v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753-54 (3rd Cir. 1995); Yates v.
Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987); Bums v. McGregor Electronic Industries,
Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 965 (8th Cir. 1993).
32. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983). See also Menchaca v. Rose
Records, Inc., No. 94-C1376, 1995 WL 151847, at *2 (N.D. 11 Apr. 3, 1995) (mem.).
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a hostile work environment.33 The employer may be liable to the harassed
employee only if the employer knew or should have known about the
harassment but failed to take appropriate action to remedy the situation. 4
C. CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
In addition to the obstacles posed by the "reasonableness" standard and
the difficulty in imputing employer knowledge for acts by non-supervisors,
plaintiffs also face challenges when the harassment spans a considerable
amount of time. 35 Single or infrequent incidents, considered separately,
often fail to rise to a level that is considered sufficiently severe and
pervasive to constitute sexual harassment.36  Thus, plaintiffs must
frequently show that they were subjected to a pattern of continuous
harassing conduct.37
Continuous harassment may consist of acts that span months and even
years before the plaintiff finally files charges against the employer with the
EEOC.38 Because of the protracted nature of many sexual harassment
situations, plaintiffs may encounter statute of limitations obstacles.
Generally, the statute of limitations period begins to run on the day the
discriminatory act occurred.39  Title VII requires that charges of
discrimination be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged
discrimination.4°  Thus, if this limitations period is strictly applied,
plaintiffs are precluded from introducing claims based upon conduct that
has been occurring longer than the limitations period. Such a rule would
often impede plaintiffs' ability to show that the harassment was pervasive
or severe.41 Several courts have acknowledged the problem the limitations
period may pose for plaintiffs and have applied "an equitable exception to
33. See Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp. 159 F.3d 759,767 (2d Cir. 1998).
34. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d)
(2000).
35. See generally Ramona L. Paetzold & Anne M. O'Leary-Kelly, Continuing Violations
And Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: When Is Enough, Enough? 31 AM. Bus. L.J.
365 (1993) (proposing a modified version of the continuing violation test for application to
claims of hostile environment sexual harassment).
36. See Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 474-75 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the trier of fact could find a continuing violation to have equitably tolled the
180 day limitations period for the plaintiffs Title VII sexual harassment claim).
37. See id. However, if one incident is sufficiently egregious this act may be enough to
constitute sexual harassment. See e.g., Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 2000 WL 122117 (2d
Cir. 2000); Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 318 (1999).
38. After an employee files charges with the EEOC, the agency reviews the charges and
determines whether they present a meritorious claim. If the charges do appear to have merit,
the agency then issues a "right to sue" letter and the employee may go forward with her
claim in court. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (visited on Mar. 12,
2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html>.
39. See Waltman, 875 F.2d at 474-75.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1994).
41. See Paetzold & O'Leary-Kelly, supra note 35, at 378-81.
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the 180 day limitation on the actionable period." 42 Some courts have held
that the statute of limitations may be equitably tolled if the plaintiff "failed
to file the EEOC charge during the 180-day period due to mental or
emotional disability."43
The Fifth Circuit has identified three initial factors that must be met
before the equitable exception will be applied.44 The first consideration is
whether the same type of discrimination is alleged in each act, thus
"tending to connect them to a continuing violation. '45  Second, the
frequency of the alleged acts is important when determining if the
exception will apply.46  If the alleged acts were recurring rather than
isolated incidents, the equitable exception is more likely to be applied.47
However, the harassment does not have to have been perpetrated by the
same individual or individuals. The question is whether the harassment
was such that a "reasonable person would feel that the environment was
hostile throughout the period that formed the plaintiff's claim. ' 41 Finally,
the court considered whether the employee should have become aware of
the need to assert her rights due to the permanence of the harassment.49
Unlike quid pro quo harassment where the loss of a promotion, for
example, will likely have some degree of permanence, the victim of a
hostile work environment may not perceive the harassment as continuous.50
As a result, she may be less likely to realize "that her rights have been
violated," thus leading her to delay filing a charge with the EEOC.51
The equitable exception to the limitation period is particularly
meaningful when the creation of a hostile work environment is due to the
actions of non-employees, rather then co-workers. Such third-party
harassment may be perpetrated not by one or two individuals, but by many
people over an extended duration. The employee may not recognize that
the conduct constitutes sexual harassment in violation of Title VII until she
has been subjected to repeated incidents.52 Even then she may fail to label
42. Waltman, 875 F.2d at 474-75.
43. Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369, 379 (W.D.N.C. 1988).
44. See Berry v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.
1983).
45. Waltman, 875 F.2d at 475.
46. See id.
47. See Quinn, 159 F.3d at 766 (acts alleged to have occurred outside of the limitations
period were "not continuous in time with one another or with the timely acts that [the
plaintiff] alleged").
48. Waltman, 875 F.2d at 476.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. See Paetzold & O'Leary-Kelly, supra note 35, at 377. While not specifically
addressing third-party harassment, the authors explain that the nature of hostile environment
harassment poses unique difficulties for plaintiffs wishing to bring suit. Ste id. These
difficulties arise from, inter alia, the lack of "discrete" incidents of harassment, the
infrequency of some types of harassing acts, and the fact that the harassment may be
[Vol. 11: 1
the behavior as harassment.
Ill. THIRD-PARTY SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Many courts now recognize that employers, in addition to being
potentially liable for harassment by supervisors and other co-workers, may
in some circumstances be liable for harassment of their employees by third
parties such as customers, 53 clients54 and independent contractors.5
A. RECOGNITION OF HARASSMENT BY THIRD PARTIES
Many of the cases involving third-party sexual harassment arose as a
result of employer policies requiring female employees to wear sexually
provocative uniforms. One of the first such cases was EEOC v. Sage
Realty Corp.56 The plaintiff in Sage, a lobby attendant in the defendants'
office building, alleged that she was harassed by members of the public due
to the provocative and revealing uniform the defendants required her to
wear.57 The plaintiff did not claim that the harassment subjected her to a
hostile working environment in violation of Title VII, as this form of
harassment had yet to be acknowledged by the courts. 58  Rather, she
contended that the defendants had discriminated against her by terminating
her employment due to her refusal to wear the uniform.59 The court found
that the defendants knew that the plaintiff was subjected to sexual
harassment due to the uniform.60 In requiring her to wear it "defendants
made her acquiescence in sexual harassment by the public... a prerequisite
of her employment., 61 The court held that requiring female employees to
wear sexually provocative outfits as a condition of employment violated
Title VI.1
62
Since Sage, at least six circuits have recognized potential employer
perpetrated by several individuals. See id. at 385-93.
53. See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998).
54. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Hemandez v. Miranda-Valez, 132 F.3d 848 (1st Cir. 1998).
55. See, e.g., Sparks v. Regional Med. Ctr. Bd., 792 F. Supp. 735 (N.D. Ala. 1992).
56. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
57. Id. at 607.
58. Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some
Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1107, 1113
(1995). Today, the plaintiff might have prevailed on such a third-party harassment claim as
she did allege that customers'/ients' conduct upset her greatly and substantially interfered
with her ability to do herjob. See Sage, 507 F. Supp. at 605. See also Robert J. Aalberts &
Lome H. Seidman, Sexual Harassment of Employees by Non-Employees: When Does the
Employer Become Liable?, 21 PEaP. L. REv. 447, 455 (1994).
59. See Sage, 507 F. Supp. at 607.
60. See id. at 609. As in Sage, the courts in Marentette v. Michigan Host Inc., 506 F.
Supp. 909 (E.D. Mich. 1980), and EEOC v. Newton Inn Associates., 647 F. Supp. 957 (E.D.
Va. 1986), similarly held that requiring female employees to wear sexually provocative
outfits as a condition of employment violated Title VII.
61. Id. at 609-10.
62. Seeid.at6lO.
Winter 20001 SERVICE WITH A SMILE
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
liability for sexual harassment by third parties (i.e. non-employees).6 3 Title
VII does not specifically address third-party sexual harassment. However,
Title VII has been held to prohibit this form of harassment, and courts
frequently rely on the EEOC guidelines which do specifically include
harassment by third parties.'
4
With increasing frequency, plaintiffs are becoming aware of the
existence of a cause of action for harassment by third parties. For example,
waitresses employed by the "Hooters" restaurant chain filed charges with
the EEOC alleging, inter alia, that the uniforms the waitresses were
required to wear, and the sexually charged atmosphere fostered by the
defendants, encouraged male employees and customers to harass them,
creating a hostile working environment.6 5 "Hooters girls," as they are often
called, are required to wear tight T-shirts with the Hooters logo across the
front (two owl eyes "strikingly reminiscent of areolas and nipples") and
short running shorts.66 There is little doubt that the waitresses in their
required uniforms provide the main draw for the primarily male clientele,
and are a large component of, if not the reason for, the company's
success.
67
The cases against Hooters, if they had gone to trial, would have
provided an interesting opportunity for the courts to develop more fully the
law regarding third-party sexual harassment. However, all of the cases
63. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848 (lst Cir. 1998);
Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759 (2d Cir. 1998); Whitaker v. Carney, 778
F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1985); Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754 (9th Cir.
1997); Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
64. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. The EEOC's guidelines state in part:
(e) An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees,
with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective
action. In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider the extent of
the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which the employer
may have with respect to the conduct of such non-employees.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1996).
To date, no cases have been decided in which the plaintiff claimed the employer was
liable for quid pro quo harassment perpetrated by a non-employee. However, one
commentator has noted that, in certain circumstances, such a claim might be conceivable.
See Mathews, supra note 2, at 990. For example, such circumstances might include an
important client conditioning the continuation of his or her business with tho plaintiff on the
plaintiffs acquiescence to unwanted sexual advances by the client. See id.
65. See Rhee, supra note 8, at 164-65.
66. Id. at 163 n.4.
67. As Mike McNeil, Hooters' vice president of marketing, stated "ITlhe essence of
Hooter's business is 'female sex appeal'." See Chuck Hutchraft, Hooters Case Won't Get a
Second Look, EEOC Chairman Cites Limited Resources, CHi. Tam., May 2, 1996, at 1.
This article discusses the EEOC's decision to not file suit against Hooters for the
restaurant's failure to hire men. See id.
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settled for an undisclosed amount before trial. That Hooters did settle
may reflect a growing acceptance of third-party sexual harassment as a
viable claim against an employer.
B. EMPLOYER LIA.BiLrry AND DEFENSES
One commentator has proposed that when an employee knowingly
accepts work in an environment where the employer is capitalizing on the
employee's sex and sexuality, an assumption of risk defense should be
available to the employer if the employee brings charges of sexual
harassment by third parties.69 Such a defense is argued to have at least two
benefits. First, it allows employees, particularly women, "the freedom to
market their sexuality and acceptance of the risk of sexual harassment in
exchange for a premium wage. 7 ° Second, the defense recognizes that
women are capable of making choices regarding their employment and
responsibly accepting the consequences of these choices.7' Courts have not
explicitly allowed employers to avoid liability for third-party sexual
harassment on an assumption of risk defense. However, the plaintiff's
conduct (e.g., style of dress worn on the job) may be considered when
determining whether or not the conduct alleged to have been harassment
was actually welcomed by the employee. 72 Similarly, the Court in Meritor
held that the totality of the circumstances must be considered when
determining if the conduct complained of was unwelcome.73 Such
language may imply that employees who voluntarily work where sex is a
commodity, for example 'strip' clubs and restaurants like Hooters, assume
the risk of being sexually harassed by customers.
Regardless of whether an assumption of the risk defense is ever
explicitly recognized by a court, sexual harassment by non-employees
raises unique questions regarding when the employer should be held liable
for the hostile or offensive work environment that results. Cases of third-
party harassment differ from those involving harassment by co-workers
because employers generally have less control over third parties than they
do over employees. However, most courts considering the issue have
applied a standard for imputing employer liability to third-party cases that
is similar to that used when a co-worker creates the hostile environment: an
employer may be liable for the creation of a hostile environment when the
employer knew or should have known about the harassment but failed to
take prompt and effective steps to remedy the situation.74 Additionally, the
68. See Rhee, supra note 8, at 180 n.85.
69. See Cahill, supra note 58.
70. Id. at 1145.
71. See id.
72. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68-9.
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., McGuire v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 988 F. Supp. 980, 987 (W.D. Va.
1997); Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1073 (10th Cir. 1998). See also
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employer may be found to have violated Title VII even if the harassing
third party is not.75
As in hostile environment cases where the harasser and victim are co-
workers, employer liability in the third-party situation will be imputed if
the harassment is so pervasive or obvious that the employer had
constructive notice of it.7 Similarly, an employer may be deemed to have
notice if the victim alerted management-level employees but the hostile
environment was not rectified.77
An employer may successfully defend against an employee's claim of
third-party sexual harassment if the employer can show that it immediately
and appropriately acted to remedy the harassment once it had notice.78 For
example, in Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enterprises Inc., the court found
that the employer-casino had taken reasonable steps to ensure that the
plaintiff, a mime employed to perform as a "living doll" on the casino
floor, was safe from customer harassment.79 The employer had provided
her with a sign stating "Stop. Do Not Touch," had a male employee escort
her while she worked, and other employees agreed to notify security if they
noticed that the plaintiff needed assistance.8°
Even when the employer has taken some steps to remedy the
harassment, such steps will not necessarily absolve the employer of
liability. The Ninth Circuit in Ellison held that "[e]mployers should
impose sufficient penalties to assure a workplace free from sexual
harassment.' 81 The reasonableness of the remedy "will depend on [the
employer's] ability to stop harassment by the person who engaged in
harassment.' '82 Additionally, the court determined that the proper question
is not what a reasonable employer would do, but rather what is reasonably
calculated to end the harassment.83 The court observed that a reasonable
employer might choose to allow the harassment to continue for fear of
loosing a valuable employee.84 Employers might be similarly reluctant to
remedy harassment perpetrated by an important client or customer.85
Mathews, supra note 2, at 991.
75. See Rodriguez-Hernandez, 132 F.3d at 853 (upholding trial court's finding of
employer liability despite grant of summary judgment in favor of the customer alleged to
have harassed the plaintiff).
76. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e)
(2000).
77. See Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1029 (D. Nev. 1992).
78. See Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2000).
79. 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997).
80. Id. at 755.
81. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991).
82. Id.
83. See id. n.17.
84. See id.
85. See L.A. Winokur, Workplace: Harassment of Workers by "Third Parties" Can Lead
Into Maze of Legal, Moral Issues, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1992.
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Remedying third-party harassment that is perpetrated by an individual,
or several individuals, against an equally limited number of employees may
involve a case-specific solution from the employer. Cases involving
harassment arising from employees being required to wear a sexually
provocative outfit and work in a sexually charged atmosphere may be
remedied by allowing employees to wear less revealing clothing.
However, what is the proper remedy when a seemingly innocuous policy
implemented by the employer leads to alleged wide-spread third-party
sexual harassment of employees? What implications does this have for
employers attempting to attract business by providing friendly, customer
oriented service?
IV. SAFEWAY'S "SUPERIOR CUSTOMER SERVICE" POLICY
On November 16, 1998, employees of Safeway, Inc., filed charges with
the EEOC alleging that Safeway's customer service policies expose them
to harassment by customers which creates a hostile working environment.
86
The charges were brought by female and male food and courtesy clerks.
Each charge alleges that Safeway's "Superior Customer Service" policy
and "Employee Improvement Programs" create an environment where
customers feel at liberty to make sexual advances and comments towards
employees, and in some instances the policy has led to assault of
employees by customers.87
The employees claim that Safeway's policies, in addition to requiring
them to make eye contact with and smile at all customers, force employees
88to suspend their natural defense mechanisms. Specifically, they allege
that the policy does not allow an employee to discontinue friendly behavior
if the customer's conduct is offensive, inappropriate or makes the employee
feel uncomfortable. The charges also state that the employees fear
disciplinary action if they do not treat every customer, regardless of the
circumstances, with the standard of service prescribed by Safeway. 89 This
standard is enforced by the use of "Mystery Shoppers" who pose as
ordinary customers but actually rate employees on their interactions with
customers. 90 The employees claim that poor reviews by a "Mystery
Shopper" may lead to the employee being required to attend customer
86. See Eric D. Randall, Smiling Requirement as Job Bias, 12 DISCRIMINATION L.
UPDATE 49 (1998).
87. See generally charges against Safeway filed on November 10, 1998, with the EEOC
(on file with author) [hereinafter Charges]. Plaintiffs are represented by the law firm of
Leonard, Carder, Nathan, Zuckerman, Ross, Chin, and Remar in Oakland, California.
88. See id. See also Jack Gordon, et al., Did a Mandatory Smile Policy Invite Customer
Come-Ons? TRAINING, Dec. 1, 1998, at 24.
89. See Kristin Downey Grimsley, Service with a Smile Effort Brings Frowns from Some:
Safeway Initiative Draws Praise from Its Customers, but Employee Criticism, STAR. TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov. 1, 1998.
90. Id.
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service training, and in some instances, to termination of employment. 91
The third-party conduct alleged by the charging employees includes:
overly-friendly comments, such as remarks about an employee being
sexually attracted to a customer; 92 notes and comments regarding sexual
acts customers would like to engage in with employees; 93 assault of
employees by customers in the stores94 and adjacent parking lots;95 and
stalking by customers.
96
In one of the more egregious examples of stalking, an employee
alleged that a certain male customer always chose her checkout line
regardless of whether there were shorter lines, repeatedly offered her
flowers in the store parking lot and followed her home from work on at
least one occasion.97 The stalking culminated in the customer mailing the
employee a copy of her car key which he had fraudulently obtained from a
car dealership by presenting the vehicle identification number from the
employee's car.
98
The charging employees claim they have seen a marked increase in
offensive customer conduct after the implementation of Safeway's policy.
For example, several employees stated that they felt compelled to continue
helping customers who made sexual comments or gave them notes about
wanting to have sex with them.99 Likewise, many of the employees stated
that customers' inappropriate behaviors would escalate when the
employees continued to follow Safeway's customer service policy after
initial incidents.'00
91. Id.
92. See Charges at 27.
93. See id. at 17
94. See id. at 11.
95. See id. at 77.
96. See id. at 62.
97. See id. at 61.
98. After this incident, the police told the customer that if he contacted the employee
again he would be arrested for violating the anti-stalking statutes. See id. The employee
stated that the customer has not contacted her since receiving this warning. See id. at 62.
99. Examples of such customer comments include repeatedly asking an employee what
color underwear she was wearing, at telling an employee that she has a "nice ass", asking
whether an employee has a husband or boyfriend and passing an employee a note at the
check stand describing the sexual activities the customer would like to do with her. See id.
100. One employee described her experience with a male customer who followed her out
to her car and offered her his telephone number. The employee stated:
Thereafter, this same customer came through my check stand every day for a
month. I still had to perform all the service attributes of smiling, greeting
and making eye contact with this man. He made repeated comments to me
during this period of the nature, 'When can I take you to lunch or
dinner?' ... and 'What time do you get off work?' He even sent me a
bouquet of flowers in the check stand which he delivered by a courtesy
clerk. I felt uncomfortable every day when I went to work with this
unwanted attention which I believed was encouraged by my having to smile,
greet and continue to be friendly.
Id. at58.
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Some of the charging employees stated they have disregarded
Safeway's policy and informed customers when their conduct became
intolerable.10  In some instances the customers apologized for their
behavior and said that they genuinely thought the employees liked them
because the employees were always so friendly.10 2 If the employees were
allowed to use their discretion when interacting with customers it is likely
that many inappropriate interactions could be quickly dealt with by the
employees.
If the EEOC issues a "right to sue" letter to the employees, the case
will present a novel situation of third-party sexual harassment. Unlike
cases involving revealing uniforms discussed above, Safeway's policies are
not attempting to capitalize on the sexual appeal of its employees.
Likewise, the charges do not specifically involve a select group of
customers who could be dealt with individually by the management.
Rather, the customer service policy itself is alleged to be the root of the
harassment.
As with all other cases of sexual harassment based upon the creation of
a hostile work environment, to prevail in court the Safeway employees will
be required to show that 1) they are members of a protected class, 2) the
customers' conduct was unwelcome, 3) the conduct was based upon sex, 4)
the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive, and 5) there is a basis
for imputing liability to Safeway. Additionally, the employees must show
that Safeway actually knew about or should have known about the
harassment.
The first three elements of the plaintiffs' case appear to be easily met.
First, both male and female employees will be considered to be members of
a protected class. Similarly, the charges allege that the offensive and
unwelcome customer behavior caused discomfort, distress and even
physical illness in the employees. Finally, the employees claim that the
conduct was directed towards them due to their respective sexes, as it was
sexual in nature.
The plaintiffs may face a more difficult hurdle in attempting to prove
that customers' behavior was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a
hostile working environment. A court might not consider each incident,
when examined separately, as satisfying the requirements of "severe or
pervasive." For example, an isolated comment by a customer about an
employee's body or perceived sexual attraction to the customer may not be
considered sufficiently severe or pervasive to give rise to a claim of sexual
harassment. However, when the comments occur on a daily basis,
employees may likely come to view their jobs as unpleasant and abusive.
Thus, it is probable that when considered as a continuing violation, the
101. See Charges at 11, 13,54.
102. See id. at 54.
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customer conduct alleged will be found to have created a hostile
environment.
Likewise, if the employees are allowed to go forward with a suit
against Safeway the Ninth Circuit will likely have jurisdiction over the
case. Thus, the customers' conduct will be considered from the victims'
perspectives, a reasonable woman or man, depending on the victim's
gender.103 Such a standard may work to the advantage of the plaintiffs. As
the court in Ellison rightly suggested, a reasonable man and a reasonable
woman may differ in what they find offensive or threatening.
°4
For example, some men may consider comments about a woman's
body to be only harmless compliments, meant to flatter the woman and
indicate her attractiveness to him. However, a reasonable woman may
interpret such "compliments" to actually be an assertion of power over her,
or even a threat of sexual assault. 10 5 By using the sex of the plaintiff as the
benchmark for what would be considered reasonable, the female plaintiffs
may have a better chance of showing that the customers' conduct created a
hostile working environment.
10 6
The final, and perhaps most difficult, issue plaintiffs will have to prove
is a basis for imputing liability to Safeway. The employees must show that
Safeway knew, or should have known, about the harassment but failed to
provide an adequate remedy. It is likely a court will find that Safeway had
reason to know employees were, at a minimum, bothered by certain
customers' behavior. Many of the charges allege that the employees
complained to their store managers about offensive customer conduct. 1°7
Knowledge by an employer has been imputed from knowledge of
harassment by management-level employees. 1°8 Thus, it is likely that a
court will consider Safeway to be on notice of harassment by customers.
Safeway may defend by arguing that it does not have sufficient control
over customers to prevent harassment, and therefore should not be held
liable for their conduct. Thousands of customers shop in Safeway stores
each day. Additionally, as one employee noted, it is commonplace for
individual customers to shop for groceries multiple times a week, even
multiple times a day. Thus, it may be difficult for the management to
determine which customers may cause problems for the employees.
103. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
104. Id.
105. See id at 878-79.
106. Some women may fear being assaulted in a parking lot, particularly at night. Several
of the charging female employees refer to incidents of able-bodied male customers
requesting assistance carrying their groceries to their cars even though the customers only
bought one or two items. See Charges at 40, 47, 50. It is likely that a reasonable woman
would be alarmed and frightened at having to comply with such a request. However, a
reasonable man, because he may not have come to associate parking lots at night with the
possibility of attack, might view such a request as strange but not particularly threatening.
107. See id. at 1, 5, 10, 49.
108. See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989).
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However, this argument is superficial and unduly formal. The concept
of control in the context of employer liability should be more responsive to
the policies behind the law of sexual harassment. 1°9 Thus, the control
requirement should be satisfied if either: 1) the employer exercises control
over the harassing actor; or 2) the employer has the power to take measures
reasonably expected to end the harassment. While Safeway does not wield
a great amount of direct control over customers, a store manager can refuse
to serve certain customers if they act inappropriately. An even more
effective solution mentioned by some of the charging employees would be
to give employees the freedom to exercise their personal judgment in
deciding whether or not to continue to be friendly to a customer." 0
While the defense of lack of adequate control over customers is weak,
Safeway might more persuasively argue against liability by asserting it
took reasonable steps to remedy harassment as it occurred. As stated
above, an employer has a duty to provide a remedy to stop harassment once
it has notice of the harassment."' Such a remedy "should persuade
individual harassers to discontinue unlawful conduct" and "assure a
workplace free from sexual harassment."' 1 2  Additionally, in analyzing
whether an employer took adequate steps to end harassment thus absolving
itself of liability, courts "may also take into account the remedy's ability to
persuade potential harassers to refrain from unlawful conduct."
'
"
13
Safeway may contend that it provided adequate remedies for
harassment from customers through the actions of individual store
managers. It appears from the EEOC charges that many store managers
have tried to stop harassment by individual customers through talking to
these customers, allowing the employee to temporarily relinquish his/her
duties if approached by the customer, and in some cases forbidding the
customer from returning to the particular store.'
1 4
However, in their charges the employees maintain that the proper
remedy is for Safeway to alter its customer service policies so employees
may use their own discretion and choose not to follow the policies'
guidelines in some circumstances. Given the alleged pervasiveness of
customer harassment at Safeway, it does appear that modification of
Safeway's policies so as to grant employees more discretion to protect
109. "Congress intended that Title VII proscribe employment discrimination 'in the
broadest possible terms' and, accordingly, it 'should be accorded a liberal interpretation in
order to effectuate the purpose of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness and
humiliation of [employment] discrimination."' Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc.,
808 F. Supp. 500, 508 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1992) (citing Rogers v. EEOC 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th
Cir. 1971)).
110. See Charges.
111. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Charges at 2, 12,24, 51, 80.
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themselves while still requiring them to be courteous to most customers is
the most effective remedy.
The practice of store managers dealing with employee harassment by
customers is only a partial solution to the problem faced by Safeway's
employees. A balance must be found between Safeway's need for
standardized customer service policies that promote high quality service
and employees' right to work in an environment free from sexual
harassment. Such a balance might be achieved by: 1) educating employees
about their rights; 2) training managers and supervisors to be sensitive and
responsive to employees' concerns regarding harassment by customers; and
3) assuring employees that they will not face discipline for refusing to be
harassed by customers. Additionally, employees' training should include
techniques for appropriately dealing with harassing customers.
Safeway's current policies appear to encourage misunderstandings
between some customers and employees, leading the customers to
misinterpret employees' friendliness as sexual interest or acquiescence in
improper behavior. Likewise, employees do not feel they can correct
inappropriate customers without fear of negative consequences. A
manager correcting one customer does nothing to prevent the next
customer from similarly misinterpreting the employee's conduct and
engaging in behavior that makes the employee uncomfortable. Allowing
employees to use their own judgment, while still being courteous when
appropriate, is the most effective remedy to protect employees from sexual
harassment by customers.
V. CONCLUSION
An outcome favorable to the plaintiffs will empower service
employees, many of whom are women. Besides supporting claims of third-
party sexual harassment, such a holding would alert other employers to the
fact that seemingly benign and reasonable policies designed to improve
customer service may expose the employer to liability if these policies also
encourage customers to make unwanted sexual advances toward
employees. Businesses can protect themselves, while still pleasing
customers, by implementing policies that allow employees to use their
judgment when deciding how friendly to be with a particular customer.
Likewise, holding Safeway liable would cause employees to have
greater awareness of their rights and to recognize sexual harassment when
it stems from customer conduct. Specifically, this holding would reinforce
that enduring unwanted advances, overly solicitous 'compliments' and
unwanted touching on the job, regardless of who performs the unwelcome
acts, does not have to be a part of the workday.
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